Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1415.91117
author: Martin Van der Linden
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2017-11-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
zbMATH DE Number: 6811301
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: veto
zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: committee selection
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2017.09.003
OpenAlex ID: W3124297748
cites work: Voting by committees under constraints
cites work: Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
cites work: Voting by Committees
cites work: Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
cites work: The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences
cites work: Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
cites work: A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
cites work: Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
cites work: Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
cites work: The structure of decision schemes with cardinal preferences
cites work: Q5526189
cites work: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency for small domains of preferences over public goods
cites work: Sophisticated voting under the sequential Voting by Veto
DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.09.003
Recommended article: Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
Recommended article: Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections.
Recommended article: Voting by committees under constraints
Recommended article: Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains
Recommended article: Q3677437
Recommended article: Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle
Recommended article: An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
Recommended article: Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
Recommended article: Analysis and design of selection committees: a game theoretic secretary problem
Recommended article: Strategy-proofness of the randomized Condorcet voting system
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6811301