Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1415.91114
author: Issofa Moyouwou
author: Hugue Tchantcho
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 2017-11-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6807734
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotic vulnerability
zbMATH Keywords: positional voting rules
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: three-candidate elections
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.mathsocsci.2017.06.006
OpenAlex ID: W2739356872
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DOI: 10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2017.06.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6807734