Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1414.91123
author: Mariam Arzumanyan
author: Mattias K. Polborn
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-12-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6815575
zbMATH Keywords: costly voting
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous participation models
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.09.016
OpenAlex ID: W2762746213
cites work: Q5558293
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.09.016
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6815575