Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evaluationwise strategy-proofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1414.91131
author: Bora Erdamar
author: M. Remzi Sanver
author: Shin Sato
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-12-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6815586
zbMATH Keywords: approval voting
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: evaluationwise strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: preference-approval
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.10.010
OpenAlex ID: W2765632604
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6815586