Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Political institutions and the evolution of character traits
zbMATH Open document ID: 1414.91055
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2017-12-05T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91F10
zbMATH DE Number: 6815588
zbMATH Keywords: evolution of character traits
zbMATH Keywords: political institutions
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary game theory
author: Jia-Bin Wu
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.10.011
OpenAlex ID: W2766879561
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.011
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6815588