Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1411.91373
author: Michele Lombardi
author: Naoki Yoshihara
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-12-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 2017-05.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6816610
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economies
zbMATH Keywords: intrinsic preferences for responsibility
zbMATH Keywords: boundary problem
zbMATH Keywords: price-quantity mechanism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2520198787
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-017-0568-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6816610