On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1411.91425
author: David Pérez-Castrillo
author: Marilda Sotomayor
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 2017-12-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 6816615
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: competitive equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: optimal competitive equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: manipulability
zbMATH Keywords: competitive equilibrium rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00182-017-0573-y
OpenAlex ID: W2593620830
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DOI: 10.1007/S00182-017-0573-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6816615