Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stable and efficient resource allocation under weak priorities
zbMATH Open document ID: 1398.91367
author: Xiang Han
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-01-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6826502
zbMATH Keywords: indivisible object
zbMATH Keywords: priority
zbMATH Keywords: house allocation
zbMATH Keywords: housing market
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.10.013
OpenAlex ID: W2766421488
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.013
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6826502