A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
zbMATH Open document ID: 1380.91094
author: Peng Zhang
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2018-02-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B74
zbMATH DE Number: 6833467
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: heterogeneous demands
zbMATH Keywords: uncertainty
zbMATH Keywords: carbon capture and storage
describes a project that uses: Ipopt
describes a project that uses: Pyomo
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2017.06.009
OpenAlex ID: W2623174919
cites work: Selection of Product Line Qualities and Prices to Signal Competitive Advantage
cites work: Capacity Choice and Allocation: Strategic Behavior and Supply Chain Performance
cites work: Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
cites work: Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems
cites work: Optimal apparel supplier selection with forecast updates under carbon emission taxation scheme
cites work: Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
cites work: Competition and Structure in Serial Supply Chains with Deterministic Demand
cites work: Commitment-penalty contracts in drop-shipping supply chains with asymmetric demand information
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Pyomo -- optimization modeling in Python
cites work: Optimal design of uptime-guarantee contracts under IGFR valuations and convex costs
cites work: Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
cites work: A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production
cites work: Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
cites work: Contracting for Infrequent Restoration and Recovery of Mission-Critical Systems
cites work: Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
cites work: The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
cites work: Setting the right incentives for global planning and operations
cites work: Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
cites work: GROWTH, RENEWABLES, AND THE OPTIMAL CARBON TAX
cites work: The Quantity Flexibility Contract and Supplier-Customer Incentives
cites work: On the implementation of an interior-point filter line-search algorithm for large-scale nonlinear programming
cites work: Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2017.06.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6833467