Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Default and liquidation timing under asymmetric information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1380.90143
author: Michi Nishihara
author: Takashi Shibata
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2018-02-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/56585
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 6835224
zbMATH Keywords: finance
zbMATH Keywords: real options
zbMATH Keywords: information asymmetries
zbMATH Keywords: bankruptcy
zbMATH Keywords: capital structure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2562949516
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2017.05.038
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6835224