Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1395.91017
author: Sylvain Béal
author: Eric Rémila
author: Philippe Solal
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2018-02-16T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 6840016
zbMATH Keywords: TU-games
zbMATH Keywords: solidarity
zbMATH Keywords: null player
zbMATH Keywords: egalitarian Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: procedural values
zbMATH Keywords: implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-017-9586-z
OpenAlex ID: W2584155954
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-017-9586-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6840016