Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust auction design under multiple priors by linear and integer programming
zbMATH Open document ID: 1404.91125
author: Çağıl Koçyiğit
author: Halil Ibrahim Bayrak
author: Mustafa Ç. Pınar
published in: Annals of Operations Research
publication date: 2018-03-02T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/50406
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C11
zbMATH DE Number: 6846272
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auction design
zbMATH Keywords: robustness
zbMATH Keywords: multiple priors
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity
zbMATH Keywords: linear programming
zbMATH Keywords: mixed-integer programming
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2588638563
cites work: Optimal Design for Multi-Item Auctions: A Robust Optimization Approach
cites work: Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
cites work: Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
cites work: Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
cites work: Q3100563
cites work: Optimization and mechanism design
DOI: 10.1007/S10479-017-2416-4
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6846272