On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91043
author: G. Bergantiños
author: Jordi Massó
author: Alejandro Neme
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-03-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/182480
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6848163
zbMATH Keywords: society membership
zbMATH Keywords: social outcome
zbMATH Keywords: serial dictator rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2600189468
cites work: Serial dictatorship: The unique optimal allocation rule when information is endogenous
cites work: Voting by Committees
cites work: Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
cites work: Stability and voting by committees with exit
cites work: On exiting after voting
cites work: An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit
cites work: On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
cites work: Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
cites work: Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
cites work: Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
cites work: Non-bossiness
DOI: 10.1007/S00355-017-1041-0
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6848163