Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91063
author: Dominique Lepelley
author: Issofa Moyouwou
author: Hatem Smaoui
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-03-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 6854355
zbMATH Keywords: scoring elimination rule
zbMATH Keywords: three-candidate election
zbMATH Keywords: monotonicity paradox
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-017-1069-1
OpenAlex ID: W2631870218
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-017-1069-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6854355