Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 1392.91110
author: Nhan-Tam Nguyen
author: Dorothea Baumeister
author: Jörg Rothe
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2018-03-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 6854358
zbMATH Keywords: resource allocation
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: scoring allocation
zbMATH Keywords: indivisible goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00355-017-1075-3
OpenAlex ID: W3016144718
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-017-1075-3
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6854358