How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
zbMATH Open document ID: 1431.91074
author: G. Bergantiños
author: Leticia Lorenzo
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2019-01-28T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 104574.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B50
zbMATH DE Number: 7007132
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: PERT
zbMATH Keywords: delays
zbMATH Keywords: penalties
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2902238082
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Wikidata QID: Q128875967
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2018.11.056
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7007132