Rebate decisions and leadership strategy in competing supply chain with heterogeneous consumers
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rebate decisions and leadership strategy in competing supply chain with heterogeneous consumers
zbMATH Open document ID: 1426.90166
DOI: 10.1155/2018/2598415
author: Ziling Wang
author: Jackson Jinhong Mi
author: Bin Liu
published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
publication date: 2019-02-08T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: Rebate is a traditional type of promotion, and it can benefit manufacturers and retailers with expanded demands. However, the impact of leadership strategy in rebate competition on supply chain members and rebate decision is still somewhat unclear. Our paper focuses on a horizontal competition with respect to both rebate and leadership between two manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer to consumers who are heterogeneous in their price sensitivity. Furthermore, we investigate the impacts of leadership strategy on profits and study rebate decision under different strategies. Our research indicates that Bertrand-Nash game benefits the retailer, but hurts manufacturers, while Stackelberg game benefits manufacturers but hurts the retailer, which shows no difference from previous studies. In addition, the sequential-move Stackelberg game could eliminate the classic prisoners' dilemma in rebate decision, which is also influenced by fixed cost control.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B42
zbMATH DE Number: 7018672
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/2598415
OpenAlex ID: W2906033116
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Wikidata QID: Q128695319
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7018672