Matching with single-peaked preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Matching with single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91521
author: Sophie Bade
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-02-28T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 7030727
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: single-peaked preferences
zbMATH Keywords: Gale's top trading cycles
zbMATH Keywords: obvious strategyproofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.12.004
OpenAlex ID: W2906482047
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Wikidata QID: Q128706072
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7030727