Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Decomposing a balanced game: a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core
zbMATH Open document ID: 1409.91017
author: Takaaki Abe
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2019-03-11T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 7033952
zbMATH Keywords: cooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: decomposition
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2018.12.009
OpenAlex ID: W2904552822
cites work: The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game
cites work: Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
cites work: Q4708452
cites work: Game Theory
cites work: A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core of a non-transferable utility game
cites work: The Core of an N Person Game
cites work: Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
Wikidata QID: Q128761646
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.12.009
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7033952