The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The impact of worst-case deviations in non-atomic network routing games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1411.90078
author: Pieter Kleer
author: Guido Schäfer
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2019-03-21T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://ir.cwi.nl/pub/27269
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 7040092
zbMATH Keywords: selfish routing
zbMATH Keywords: perturbations
zbMATH Keywords: deviation ratio
zbMATH Keywords: price of risk aversion
zbMATH Keywords: biased price of anarchy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2777156773
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DOI: 10.1007/S00224-017-9829-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7040092