Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Analyzing power in weighted voting games with super-increasing weights
zbMATH Open document ID: 1422.91067
author: Yuval Filmus
author: Joel Oren
author: Yair Zick
author: Yoram Bachrach
published in: Theory of Computing Systems
publication date: 2019-03-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7040096
zbMATH Keywords: weighted voting games
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley values
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00224-018-9865-2
OpenAlex ID: W2802632589
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Wikidata QID: Q129882273
DOI: 10.1007/S00224-018-9865-2
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7040096