Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stackelberg versus Cournot: a differential game approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1411.91379
author: Luca Colombo
author: Paola Labrecciosa
publication date: 2019-03-27T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B76
zbMATH DE Number: 7043303
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly
zbMATH Keywords: renewable resources
zbMATH Keywords: market efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: feedback Stackelberg equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2018.10.007
OpenAlex ID: W2917730147
cites work: Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
cites work: Q4226167
cites work: Differential games with mixed leadership: The open-loop solution
cites work: Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly.
cites work: Comparative dynamics in a productive asset oligopoly
cites work: On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
cites work: On nonrenewable resource oligopolies: the asymmetric case
cites work: On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel-fringe game
cites work: The joint exploitation of a productive asset: A game-theoretic approach
cites work: Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
cites work: Q3997210
cites work: Oligopoly exploitation of a private property productive asset
cites work: On the convergence to the Cournot equilibrium in a productive asset oligopoly
cites work: On the Markovian efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria
cites work: Q5563225
cites work: Noncooperative solutions for a differential game model of fishery
cites work: Q4328564
cites work: Existence and properties of equilibria for a dynamic game on productive assets
cites work: The tragedy of the commons?
cites work: How different can strategic models be?
cites work: Strategic dynamic interaction. Fish wars
cites work: The compleat fish wars: Biological and dynamic interactions
cites work: First Mover and Second Mover Advantages
cites work: Strong time-consistency in the cartel-versus-fringe model
cites work: Games and dynamic games
cites work: HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED*
cites work: Social Welfare in a Common Property Oligopoly
cites work: Q3083938
cites work: Endogenous sequencing of firm decisions
cites work: Extinction in common property resource models: an analytically tractable example
cites work: Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
cites work: Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: A Multiple Leader Stackelberg Model and Analysis
cites work: On the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
cites work: Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games
cites work: Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
cites work: Markov-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of resource games
cites work: Q4610958
cites work: Q3959704
Wikidata QID: Q128319997
DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2018.10.007
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7043303