A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91343
author: Berthold Vöcking
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68W20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68W25
zbMATH DE Number: 7044660
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: multi-unit auctions
zbMATH Keywords: universal truthfulness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2013.12.007
OpenAlex ID: W1988539619
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.007
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044660