On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On equilibria in games with imperfect recall
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91082
author: Nicolas S. Lambert
author: Adrian Marple
author: Yoav Shoham
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A18
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 7044669
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect recall
zbMATH Keywords: multiselves
zbMATH Keywords: absentminded driver
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.09.007
OpenAlex ID: W2893200946
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044669