Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91539
author: Bertan Turhan
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 7044671
zbMATH Keywords: school partitions
zbMATH Keywords: divided enrollment
zbMATH Keywords: school choice
zbMATH Keywords: fairness
zbMATH Keywords: non-wastefulness
zbMATH Keywords: preference manipulation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.09.015
OpenAlex ID: W2894935954
cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
cites work: Median stable matchings in two-sided markets
cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
cites work: Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
cites work: Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem
cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
cites work: School Choice with Consent*
cites work: Two school systems, one district: what to do when a unified admissions process is impossible
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
cites work: Median stable matching for markets with wages
Wikidata QID: Q129141575
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.015
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044671