Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential second-price auctions with private budgets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91327
author: Gagan Ghosh
author: Heng Liu
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 7044693
zbMATH Keywords: sequential
zbMATH Keywords: second-price auctions
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: budgets
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.11.005
OpenAlex ID: W2901426355
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.11.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044693