Voting with public information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Voting with public information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91253
author: Shuo Liu
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: econwp191.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7044697
zbMATH Keywords: strategic voting
zbMATH Keywords: collective decision-making
zbMATH Keywords: public information
zbMATH Keywords: committee design
zbMATH Keywords: optimal voting rule
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122272368
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Wikidata QID: Q128760610
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.11.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044697