The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The problem of multiple commons: a market design approach
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91401
author: Ryan Tierney
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
zbMATH DE Number: 7044703
zbMATH Keywords: incentive-compatibility
zbMATH Keywords: min-price equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: commons
zbMATH Keywords: indivisible goods
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.10.007
OpenAlex ID: W2584867711
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Wikidata QID: Q128965213
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.10.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044703