Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Designing mechanisms to focalize welfare-improving strategies
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91525
author: Daniel E. Fragiadakis
author: Peter Troyan
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-03-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
zbMATH DE Number: 7044715
zbMATH Keywords: dictatorship
zbMATH Keywords: indifference
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: welfare
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: experiments
describes a project that uses: Z-Tree
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2019.02.002
OpenAlex ID: W2912607242
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7044715