Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
zbMATH Open document ID: 1461.91197
author: Tamás Fleiner
author: Zsuzsanna Jankó
published in: Algorithms
publication date: 2019-03-26T00:00:00Z
review text: Summary: We build an abstract model, closely related to the stable marriage problem and motivated by Hungarian college admissions. We study different stability notions and show that an extension of the lattice property of stable marriages holds in these more general settings, even if the choice function on one side is not path independent. We lean on Tarski's fixed point theorem and the substitutability property of choice functions. The main virtue of the work is that it exhibits practical, interesting examples, where non-path independent choice functions play a role, and proves various stability-related results.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 06B99
zbMATH DE Number: 7042195
zbMATH Keywords: stable matchings
zbMATH Keywords: college admission
zbMATH Keywords: choice function
zbMATH Keywords: lattice
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/a7010032
OpenAlex ID: W2001236072
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
cites work: The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
cites work: A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
cites work: College admissions with stable score-limits
cites work: A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
DOI: 10.3390/A7010032
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7042195