Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Designing multi-period supply contracts in a two-echelon supply chain with asymmetric information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1430.90112
author: Zahra Mobini
author: Wilco van den Heuvel
author: Albert P. M. Wagelmans
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2019-04-23T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: EI-Report-2014-28.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C11
zbMATH DE Number: 7046569
zbMATH Keywords: supply chain contracting
zbMATH Keywords: coordination mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: lot-sizing
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: type-dependent outside options
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2203243570
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Wikidata QID: Q128258754
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.03.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7046569