Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Gratitude, conscience, and reciprocity: models of supplier motivation when quality is non-contractible
zbMATH Open document ID: 1431.90023
author: Sumit Sarkar
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2019-04-23T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B43
zbMATH DE Number: 7046575
zbMATH Keywords: behavioural OR
zbMATH Keywords: psychological game theory
zbMATH Keywords: non-contractible quality
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent problem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2019.02.047
OpenAlex ID: W2921677070
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Wikidata QID: Q128246248
DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2019.02.047
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7046575