Receiver's dilemma
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Receiver's dilemma
zbMATH Open document ID: 1388.91065
author: Hanjoon Michael Jung
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 2018-04-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6861215
zbMATH Keywords: credibility
zbMATH Keywords: information manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: receiver's dilemma
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jmateco.2018.01.005
OpenAlex ID: W2790368574
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2018.01.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6861215