On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in the multiple leader-follower game
zbMATH Open document ID: 1394.91019
author: Ludovic A. Julien
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2018-05-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B54
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A65
zbMATH DE Number: 6872235
zbMATH Keywords: multi-agents systems
zbMATH Keywords: best response
zbMATH Keywords: existence
zbMATH Keywords: uniqueness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2016.06.070
OpenAlex ID: W2320049973
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.06.070
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6872235