Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining
zbMATH Open document ID: 1390.91019
author: Volker Britz
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 6875618
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
zbMATH Keywords: rent-seeking
zbMATH Keywords: surplus destruction
zbMATH Keywords: discount factor
zbMATH Keywords: timing
zbMATH Keywords: commitment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.12.005
OpenAlex ID: W2774789528
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875618