Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibrium informativeness in veto games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1390.91069
author: Dmitry Lubensky
author: Eric Schmidbauer
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6875624
zbMATH Keywords: veto
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: physician-induced demand
zbMATH Keywords: non-compliance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.11.010
OpenAlex ID: W3122749082
cites work: Optimal Delegation
cites work: Selecting Cheap-Talk Equilibria
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Authority and Communication in Organizations
cites work: Q3767079
cites work: Veto-based delegation
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.11.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875624