Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: characterization of minimum price rule
zbMATH Open document ID: 1390.91228
author: Yu Zhou
author: Shigehiro Serizawa
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 6875636
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: non-quasi-linearity
zbMATH Keywords: minimum price rule
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium structure
zbMATH Keywords: normal-richness
zbMATH Keywords: common-object-ranking domain
zbMATH Keywords: common-tiered-object domain
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2017.12.019
OpenAlex ID: W3124122639
cites work: Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
cites work: Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
cites work: Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
cites work: The core of the matching game
cites work: A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
cites work: Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach
cites work: Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions
cites work: Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages
cites work: Non-Manipulable House Allocation With Rent Control
cites work: Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity
cites work: Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods
cites work: Auction design without quasilinear preferences
cites work: The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
cites work: The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain
cites work: Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
cites work: Housing markets with indivisibilities
cites work: Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences
cites work: School Choice with Consent*
cites work: Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
cites work: On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
cites work: Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
cites work: Vickrey allocation rule with income effect
cites work: Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
cites work: An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
cites work: Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
cites work: A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2017.12.019
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875636