Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1402.91522
author: Franz Diebold
author: Martin Bichler
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
zbMATH DE Number: 6875769
zbMATH Keywords: decision support management
zbMATH Keywords: matching under preferences
zbMATH Keywords: course assignment
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2016.12.011
OpenAlex ID: W2560667248
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875769