Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
zbMATH Open document ID: 1403.91169
author: Salman Fadaei
author: Martin Bichler
published in: European Journal of Operational Research
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 6875809
zbMATH Keywords: auctions/bidding
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: approximation mechanisms
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.ejor.2016.12.031
OpenAlex ID: W2562618346
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DOI: 10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.12.031
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875809