Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
zbMATH Open document ID: 1422.91036
author: Vivek Bhattacharya
author: Lucas Manuelli
author: Ludwig Straub
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 6875931
zbMATH Keywords: linearity
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect public monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.01.004
OpenAlex ID: W3125614942
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875931