A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism
zbMATH Open document ID: 1422.91387
author: Battal Doğan
author: Serhat Doğan
author: Kemal Yıldız
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11693/48988
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15
zbMATH DE Number: 6875939
zbMATH Keywords: ex-ante efficiency
zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic assignment
zbMATH Keywords: fairness
zbMATH Keywords: probabilistic serial mechanism
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121216619
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.01.011
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875939