Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic relational contracts under complete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1422.91441
author: J. P. Thomas
author: Tim Worrall
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2018-05-29T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 6875953
zbMATH Keywords: relational contracts
zbMATH Keywords: self-enforcement
zbMATH Keywords: limited commitment
zbMATH Keywords: risk sharing
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1527980237
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.02.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6875953