Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Rare but severe concerted punishment that favors cooperation
zbMATH Open document ID: 1418.91127
author: Kuiying Deng
author: Zhuozheng Li
author: Shun Kurokawa
author: Tianguang Chu
published in: Theoretical Population Biology
publication date: 2019-01-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
zbMATH DE Number: 6997997
zbMATH Keywords: finite population
zbMATH Keywords: fixation probability
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionarily stable strategy
zbMATH Keywords: public goods game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.tpb.2012.02.005
OpenAlex ID: W2014418004
Wikidata QID: Q51805424
cites work: The Evolution of Cooperation
cites work: The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions
cites work: Coordinated Punishment of Defectors Sustains Cooperation and Can Proliferate When Rare
cites work: Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions
cites work: Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
cites work: Generous cooperators can outperform non-generous cooperators when replacing a population of defectors
cites work: Q3040961
cites work: Q3266127
cites work: Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
cites work: Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation
DOI: 10.1016/J.TPB.2012.02.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6997997