King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91183
author: Xianqiang Yang
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-01-14T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: cesifo1 wp6169.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A06
zbMATH DE Number: 7001162
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
zbMATH Keywords: interactive epistemology
zbMATH Keywords: player set cardinality
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2564623871
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.07.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001162