Communication with evidence in the lab
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Communication with evidence in the lab
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91189
author: Jeanne Hagenbach
author: Eduardo Perez-Richet
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2019-01-14T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7001163
zbMATH Keywords: sender-receiver game
zbMATH Keywords: hard evidence
zbMATH Keywords: information disclosure
zbMATH Keywords: masquerade relation
zbMATH Keywords: skepticism
zbMATH Keywords: obvious dominance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2018.09.002
OpenAlex ID: W2895870492
cites work: Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
cites work: Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
cites work: Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
cites work: Q4805737
cites work: A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission
cites work: Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
cites work: Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation.
cites work: An experimental study of strategic information transmission
cites work: Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
cites work: Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
cites work: An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
cites work: Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
cites work: Strategic Information Revelation
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
cites work: On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
cites work: OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF TOP TRADING CYCLES
cites work: Monotone equilibria in Bayesian games of strategic complementarities
cites work: Communication with multiple senders: An experiment
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2018.09.002
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001163