Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Experimentation with reputation concerns -- dynamic signalling with changing types
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91232
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 7001695
zbMATH Keywords: strategic experimentation
zbMATH Keywords: exponential bandits
zbMATH Keywords: Poisson bandits
zbMATH Keywords: reputation concerns
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic signalling
author: Caroline D. Thomas
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2018.11.003
OpenAlex ID: W2901181722
cites work: Disclosure and Choice
cites work: Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility
cites work: Reputation for Quality
cites work: Potential competition in preemption games
cites work: Career concerns with exponential learning
cites work: Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning*
cites work: Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
cites work: Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
cites work: Arm's Length Relationships
cites work: The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
cites work: Dynamic quality signaling with hidden actions
cites work: Reputation building through costly adjustment
cites work: Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
cites work: Preemption Games with Private Information
cites work: Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits
cites work: Breakdowns
cites work: Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
cites work: Learning and information aggregation in an exit game
cites work: Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market
cites work: Q3998711
cites work: On games of strategic experimentation
cites work: Social Learning in One-Arm Bandit Problems
cites work: Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation
cites work: Education Signalling with Preemptive Offers
cites work: A dynamic model of certification and reputation
Wikidata QID: Q128818252
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.11.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001695