Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91395
author: David Delacrétaz
author: Simon Loertscher
author: Leslie M. Marx
author: Tom Wilkening
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/219217
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 7001696
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: assignment games
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorems
zbMATH Keywords: decomposability
zbMATH Keywords: size-dependent discounts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2900626958
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Wikidata QID: Q128885367
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.11.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001696