The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The single-peaked domain revisited: a simple global characterization
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91276
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://publikationen.bibliothek.kit.edu/1000062015
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B12
zbMATH DE Number: 7001727
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: restricted domains
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet domains
zbMATH Keywords: single-peakedness
zbMATH Keywords: majority voting
zbMATH Keywords: single-crossing property
author: Clemens Puppe
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2798107862
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Wikidata QID: Q130151745
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.03.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001727