Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91400
author: Yangwei Song
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58104/
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B32
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
zbMATH DE Number: 7001747
zbMATH Keywords: efficient implementation
zbMATH Keywords: ambiguity aversion
zbMATH Keywords: multidimensional signal
zbMATH Keywords: interdependent valuation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3121666339
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Wikidata QID: Q129857247
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001747