Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
zbMATH Open document ID: 1419.91531
author: Fuhito Kojima
author: Akihisa Tamura
author: Makoto Yokoo
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2019-01-15T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: MPRA paper 56189.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 90C27
zbMATH DE Number: 7001750
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching
zbMATH Keywords: market design
zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts
zbMATH Keywords: matching with constraints
zbMATH Keywords: discrete convex analysis
zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1766224868
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Wikidata QID: Q129795565
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.004
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7001750